This paper assesses the impact of external and internal factors on output loss in emerging economies during the "Great Recession". In particular, trade and capital openness are the external factors considered, while financial institutions and the quality of governance are the internal ones. The fixed effect estimates of an unbalanced panel of 122 emerging countries observed from 2008 to 2010 yields three main results. First, trade openness has played a major role in emerging markets and it has exacerbated output loss in the crisis period. Second, when significant, capital openness can help mitigate the negative impact of an external shock, but this is conditional on the level of financial development. Moreover, the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of direct output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions. Finally, our analysis supports the hypothesis of possible inter-relations between financial and institutional development on the crisis's severity. For instance, a high leverage has exacerbated output loss in low-quality institution countries, while the liquidity ratio has buffered it in high-quality institution economies.
Introduction
Drastic reductions in output growth were observed in both advanced and emerging economies between 2008 and 2010 as a consequence of the [2007] [2008] global financial crisis (IMF, 2015) . Different explanations have been put forward as to the origins of the crisis: global imbalances, lax financial regulation and corporate governance, over-leveraging, securitization, poor ratings agencies and inadequate monetary policy (see Kristin et al., 2012 , for a complete overview). Among them, the importance of "external factors", such as global imbalances has been widely documented as one of the key crisis-triggering mechanisms in developed countries (see for example Council of Economic Advisers, 2009, and Chinn, Eichengreen and Ito, 2014) .
As regards emerging markets, it has been suggested that their growth rates, during the financial crisis as well as in its aftermath, were strongly influenced not only by external factors but also by internal ones (IMF, 2014) . In other words, both the classic determinants of the current account, i.e. trade and capital openness, as well as financial and institutional features, seem to have been important determinants of the crisis's severity in laggard economies. Despite the important role that the aforementioned factors may have played in making some emerging countries more vulnerable than others to such an exogenous shock, we are not aware of any study that attempts their systematic and general assessment. 1 Hence, the main aim of the present work is to fill this gap in the literature. A key contribution of the present work, therefore, consists in empirical assessment of how both openness and internal institutional features affected the output response of emerging economies to the external shock of the global crisis. The internal factors considered are those related to the functioning and development of financial institutions and markets, as well as the quality of governance. In particular, the main novelty of the paper is its one-by-one assessment of the impact of individual features of the financial systems on countries' output loss due to the financial crisis.
To this end, we rely on the financial indicators collected in the Cihak et al. (2012) Global Financial Development Database and, following its theoretical framework, we carefully consider the complexity of countries' financial development. More in detail, we tackle the issue of financial systems' multidimensionality by analyzing four salient characteristics: financial depth, access, efficiency and stability, for both financial institutions and markets. Moreover, drawing on Chinn and Ito (2006) we consider the possible inter-relations between financial and institutional development. We explore whether the impact of external and internal factors on output loss is influenced by the quality of institutions, as measured by the Kaufmann indicators of good governance.
For these purposes, we consider a panel of up to 122 emerging market economies, identified according to the IMF WEO (2008 WEO ( , 2015 lists, observed between 2008 and 2010. Our approach, which relies on a 3-year panel, is motivated by the fact that the timing of the crisis was different across countries. As noted by Claessens et al. (2010) , if one looks only at growth in 2008, the picture may not be very realistic because some countries that appear to have been relatively unscathed in 2008 were badly hit in 2009, and to a lesser extent in 2010. In particular, various studies (see Didier et al., 2011 , for a review) have documented that emerging countries were hit hardest in 2009, the central year in our three-year panel.
The main results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. First, trade openness has played a major role in emerging markets, and it has exacerbated output loss in the crisis period. Second, when significant, capital openness has mitigated crisis output loss. However, capital openness statistical significance is related to the internal characteristics of financial systems. Moreover, it has been found that the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of direct output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions. Finally, our analysis has highlighted some inter-relations between financial and institutional development. In particular, it has been shown that the stability of financial institutions is relevant only when institutional quality has been considered. Overall the results of our analysis contribute to extending the existing literature and are in line with those of Fratzscher (2011) and Lane (2013) in so far as they show that crisis responses have been highly heterogeneous across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the data and the methodology employed. Section 3 contains some descriptive evidence and the discussion of the main econometric results. We conclude with some final remarks and policy implications.
Empirical Specification, Econometric Technique and Data
As explained in the Introduction, the main objective of this paper is to conduct a systematic assessment of the role played by both external and internal factors in emerging economies' output loss due to the global financial crisis, with particular regard to the characteristics of financial systems and the quality of governance.
As for the external factors, we consider the traditional determinants of the current account, which are trade and capital openness. Instead, as regards the internal features, we explicitly consider the development and functioning of financial institutions and markets, as well as the quality of governance.
The unified empirical framework adopted here makes it possible to take both external and internal factors into consideration. It is formally written as: WEO April 2015. 3 In essence, our crisis indicator represents the "growth surprises" that can be ascribed to the global financial crisis. Hence, by its construction, the indicator rules out a number of serious endogeneity issues (e.g. simultaneity) that might undermine the consistency of any econometric result.
Moreover, because it was calculated for three years (2008) (2009) (2010) , it makes it possible to provide a realistic picture of the costs, in output terms, associated with the Great Recession.
Turning to the other variables, TO was taken as the sum of exports and imports ratios to GDP. The data come from World Bank Development Indicators. KO is the Chinn Ito Index, as in its latest release, i.e. January 2015. Chinn and Ito (2006) introduced an index to measure the degree of capital openness, called KAOPEN. This The variable FD captures some salient features of financial intermediaries and markets that, in the spirit of Beck et al. (2000 and and Cihak et al. (2012) , describe the functioning of the financial side of an economy. In particular, following the 4x2 matrix of Cihak et al. (2012) , we considered the depth, the accessibility, the efficiency, and the stability of both financial intermediaries and markets. Overall, we analysed the impact of 26 variables selected on the basis of data availability. See Table A1 in the appendix for full details on the financial variables employed.
In order to assess how the quality of governance affected the responsiveness to the global crisis, we investigated whether the impact of the variables of interest depended on countries' institutional set-ups. A growing number of studies have recently provided supportive evidence for the likely non-linearity between both the external and the internal factors considered here and political institutions. Hence, given the likely interrelations among trade, capital openness, financial development and institutions, the impact of our explanatory variables on crisis output loss can be expected to change depending on the country's institutional environment. To measure institutional quality we employed the Kaufmann indicators of good governance. More specifically, we aggregated three of the available indictors, namely Rule of Law, Control of Corruption and Bureaucratic quality, into a composite index calculated using the Cronbach Coefficient Alpha 4 . To understand how trade, capital openness and the functioning of the financial system affected the extent of the crisis in different institutional environments, we divided our sample into two groups of countries, namely countries with good institutional quality and countries with very low institutional quality. This division was made on the 25th percentile of the aggregate institutional index for the sample considered. Hence countries for which the institutional indicator assumed a value above the 25 th percentile were classified as good quality institutions, and as ones of very low quality otherwise. 5 For conciseness, we only report the results based on the aggregate index. However, we repeated the same exercise for the six institutional indicators provided by the Kaufmann dataset (government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law, corruption control, voice and accountability and regulatory quality. See Table A1 for full details on the institutional variables employed. 6 Our econometric analysis relied on a fixed effects estimator on an unbalanced panel of 122 emerging countries, observed between 2008 and 2010 and identified according to the lists reported in the IMF WEO (2008 WEO ( , 2015 . In order to avoid endogeneity issues, all the right hand side variables of Equation (1) were taken as the average of the previous three years, while, given the high persistency of institutions, such indicators are contemporaneous (see Berkmen et al., 2012; and Chinn, Ito and Eichengreen, 2014 for similar choices). Moreover, the main advantages of a panel with a fixed effect estimator is that the omitted variable bias is largely avoided by controlling for country level heterogeneity. This is particularly important in this context, because the sampled countries exhibit high levels of time invariant heterogeneity (e.g., resource abundance, geographical position and morphology). 7 To gain better understanding of the relationship between institutions and characteristics of financial systems, we first investigate whether financial systems are systematically different between the two groups of interest (very low vs. good quality institutions). The depth of financial institutions and markets is generally greater in good-quality institutions countries (especially if measured by the level of government effectiveness). For instance, the ratio of bank private credit to GDP is 13% in the low-quality institutions group and 34% in the high-quality one. This means that financial institutions provide higher credit services in good-quality institutions countries. Unsurprisingly, there is greater access to financial institutions in good-quality institutions countries, where the number of bank accounts per 1000 adults is 593, against 90 in the very low-quality institutions group.
Results

Descriptive Evidence
The indicators of the efficiency of financial institutions are also systematically different between the two groups. Generally, the data indicate that financial institutions are more efficient in countries with good-quality political institutions. For instance, overhead costs to total assets and the cost to income ratios are higher in very low-quality institutions countries. But there are exceptions. Returns on assets (ROA) and on equity (ROE) are higher in the low-quality institutions group. Credit to government and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to GDP is higher in the good-quality institutions group. This is to be expected, given the prominence that the SOEs of emerging markets have acquired in the past few years. Indeed, UNCTAD (2014) documents that SOEs account for more than 11% of global FDI flows, and that 60% of the latter are from emerging markets.
Econometric Results
Our empirical analysis was based on two main exercises. First, we estimated Equation (1) for the entire sample of emerging economies. Hence, we assessed the importance of trade and capital openness as well as financial system's characteristics for output loss due to the financial crisis. Tables 5 to 8 report the results. Second, we estimated (1) in two distinct groups of countries: those with high and those with low institutional quality. We were thus able to identify whether the impact of the internal and external factors on the crisis's severity was dependent on countries' institutional set-ups. Tables 9-11 collect these estimates.
Overall, our results can be summarized as follows. First, trade openness has played a major role in emerging markets, and it has exacerbated output loss in the period of crisis. Second, when significant, capital openness has mitigated crisis output loss. Third, capital openness statistical significance is related to the internal characteristics of financial systems, and to the depth of institutions and markets in particular. Fourth, the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of direct output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions. 8 Fifth, the stability of financial institutions turns out to be relevant only when institutional quality has been considered, while the effects of financial markets' depth seem to be unrelated with political institutions. Finally, the accessibility of financial institutions has had no effect across specifications.
More in detail, as regards trade openness, the results reported in Tables 5-8 show that an increase of one percentage point in the aforementioned variable has led to an average loss of 2 percentage points of output growth. This finding holds across specifications, and the magnitude of the effect ranges from 0.8 to 3.3 percentage points. Qualitatively, our results confirm the detrimental effect of trade openness already found by a large part of the established literature. 9 For example, Claessens et al. (2010) (2015) have highlighted the importance of trade orientation and production structure for sensitivity to foreign shocks. In particular, this work shows that emerging countries have high elasticity of growth to trading partners' growth, and that for commodity-exporting developing economies in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East the main channels of transmission of foreign shocks are those of emerging market leaders like China. It should be also mentioned that a part of the literature -not focusing on the "Great Recession" period -has found that trade openness makes countries less vulnerable to severe sudden stops (e.g. Cavallo and Frankel, 2008) .
Turning to capital openness, our results show that "financial globalisation" did not have a significant impact on output loss in emerging markets (see Tables 5-11 ). This general finding is in line with those of Chinn, Ito and Eichengreen (2014) , who show that capital openness did not play a major role in determining the current account behaviour in emerging countries for the period 2006-2008. In addition, Broner et al. (2013) show limited foreign capital retrenchment in emerging markets' economies during crises. 10 Nonetheless, on closer inspection of Table 5 , it is interesting to note that capital openness has a significant mitigating effect when we control for deposit money bank assets to overall deposit assets (Column 3) and central bank assets (Column 5). In particular, an increase of one percentage point in capital openness is associated with a 0.45 percentage points lower output loss. This is consistent with the descriptive evidence provided by Lane (2013) , which shows that financial openness amplified the crisis in some countries, whereas it provided a buffer for others. In particular, our findings seem to suggest that capital openness mitigated the impact of the crisis in countries with relatively better political institutions (see Table 9 , Column 3 and 4), and also if we control for the size of central bank assets to GDP. 11 The analysis of internal factors, namely financial systems' characteristics and the quality of governance, shows that the efficiency of financial institutions and the depth of financial markets have played a role in the overall sample (see Tables 7 and   8 ), while institutions' depth and stability turn out to be significant only when the quality of governance is considered (see Tables 9 and 10 ). As regards Financial Institutions' Efficiency (i.e. Table 10 ), our results show that higher returns on financial institutions' assets (Column 5) and higher credit to government (Column 8) made countries more vulnerable to the crisis while a higher lending-deposit spread (Column 2) mildly mitigated crisis output loss. These findings seem to support -from a very specific perspective -the much more general views expressed by De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) and Méon and Weill (2010) , who envisage a negative relationship between growth and the functioning of the financial system. 12 Turning to Financial Markets, Table 8 shows that the depth of markets, as measured through International Debt issues (Column 3), as well as Equity and Debt liabilities (Columns 4 and 6), significantly cushioned the effect of the crisis on output.
Hence, fund-raising by financial markets from foreign investors as well as from short or long term investors turns out to be very important in the context of emerging markets. This result can also partly support the "financial catch-up" hypothesis of Goyal et al. (2011) , as debt is often associated with final stages of the financial growth cycle, as illustrated by Berger and Udell (1998) .
Turning to the relationship between financial system functioning and governance, Table 9 (Columns 1, 2 and 5) shows that Financial Institutions' depth was detrimental in countries characterized by low institutional quality. Moreover, as far as stability is concerned, Table 10 supports the findings of Berkmen et al. (2012) , since it shows that a high leverage exacerbated output loss in low-quality institution countries (Table 10 , column 1), while the liquidity ratio buffered the output loss, but only in high-quality institution economies (Table 10 , column 2). As for the accessibility of financial systems, as measured by bank accounts or bank branches per inhabitant, Table 6 (Columns 1 and 2) shows that this feature had no effect on output loss, even when institutional quality is taken into account. In this regard, it is important to note that Cihak et al. (2012) document that the global financial crisis generated less financial stability and less access. Hence, it seems that restricted access to financial services did not impact on countries' vulnerability, while liquidity availability did so, especially in low-quality institution economies.
Overall, the results of our analysis are in line with those of Fratzscher (2011), which highlight that crisis responses were highly heterogeneous across countries, and that a large part of this heterogeneity can be explained by differences in the quality of domestic institutions.
Conclusions and policy implications
This study has empirically assessed how both (trade and capital) openness Our results show that trade openness has played a major role in emerging economies by exacerbating output losses due to the global financial crisis; this finding is significant in all specifications, and the magnitude of the effect is remarkable. Capital openness statistical significance is related to some internal characteristics of financial systems (the depth of financial institutions and markets in particular) and, when significant, it contributed to mitigating crisis output loss, especially in countries with high quality institutions. Moreover, we have found that the development of financial markets has mattered more, in terms of output loss mitigation, than that of financial institutions; however, a distinction of the sample countries between market-based vs. bank-based financial systems produced not significant results. Finally, we have found supportive evidence on the inter-relations between financial and institutional development. In particular, the stability of financial institutions appears to be relevant only when institutional quality is considered. In addition, we have obtained a number of more specific results, of which here we highlight only the following: (i) higher returns on financial institutions' assets and a higher ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the government and state-owned enterprises to GDP (two of the variables measuring the efficiency of financial institutions) made countries more vulnerable to the impact of the global crisis while a higher lending-deposit spread mildly mitigated crisis output loss; (ii) the depth of markets, as measured through International Debt issues as well as Equity and Debt liabilities, significantly cushioned the effect of the crisis on output; (iii) the depth of Financial Institutions was detrimental in countries characterized by low institutional quality; (iv) a high leverage has exacerbated output loss in low-quality institution countries; (v) a higher liquidity ratio buffered the output loss but only in high-quality institution economies.
As for the policy implications, a first obvious but important consideration concerns the huge consequences that a financial crisis originating in a big country, such as the US, may have in today's globalised context (dominated by a high and growing trade openness and financial interdependences): a well-designed "regulatory and governance system" is crucial for preventing the occurrence of global financial crises. 13 Before turning to more specific policy implications, it should be borne in mind that the policy implications derived from any analysis conducted in "normal times" are necessarily different from those that can be deduced from "crisis times" (i.e. when the impact of an external negative shock is investigated). Given the period of time analyzed here, the policy implications of the present analysis center on the relative importance of external and internal factors in crisis times. 14 Over the past decades, a growing body of theoretical and empirical literature has shown the prevailing beneficial impact of greater openness on economic growth and development. However, more open (especially small) economies suffer more from the worsening of the (growth rate of) international trade that accompanies a global financial crisis, and they need to have room for more active counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. Our results suggest that capital openness can help mitigate the negative impact of an external shock, but this is conditional on institutional quality. Therefore structural policies improving the quality of governance are needed to increase resilience to external negative shocks. The investigation of the various financial institutions and markets features does not allow the drawing of general policy implications, for example in favor of more market-based or more bank-based financial systems. As regards more specific policy implications, we mention only that policy makers (i) should be aware that higher bank credit to state-owned enterprises may be associated with greater output loss, (ii) should promote improvement in the quality of institutions (especially in the countries where they are of low quality). In fact, according to our results, high quality governance makes it possible to avoid the negative effect linked to higher depth and leverage of financial institutions, while it permits the positive effect related to a higher liquidity ratio.
Our results contribute to shedding more light on the determinants of the severity of the 2008 global financial crisis and the consequent "Great Recession" in emerging economies. Our results could also stimulate further theoretical and empirical research on the topic of heterogeneous responses to external big shocks.
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS & COUNTRY LIST
TABLES -all countries
GFDD mGFDDEI02
Lending-deposit spread (%).Difference between lending rate and deposit rate. Lending rate is the rate charged by banks on loans to the private sector, and deposit interest rate is the rate offered by commercial banks on three-month deposits.
GFDD mGFDDEI03
Non-interest income to total income (%).Bank's income that has been generated by non-interest related activities as a percentage of total income (netinterest income plus non-interest income). Non-interest related income includes net gains on trading and derivatives, net gains on other securities, net fees and commissions and other operating income.
GFDD mGFDDEI04
Overhead costs to total assets (%).Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the value of all held assets. Total assets include total earning assets, cash and due from banks, foreclosed real estate, fixed assets, goodwill, other intangibles, current tax assets, deferred tax, discontinued operations and other assets.
GFDD mGFDDEI05
Return on assets (%).Commercial banks' net income to yearly averaged total assets.
GFDD mGFDDEI06
Return on equity (%).Commercial banks' net income to yearly averaged equity.
GFDD mGFDDEI07
Cost to income ratio (%).Operating expenses of a bank as a share of the sum of net-interest revenue and other operating income.
GFDD mGFDDEI08
Credit to government and state-owned enterprises. Ratio between credit by domestic money banks to the government and state-owned enterprises and GDP.
GFDD Financial Institutions Stability mGFDDSI01
Bank z score. This captures the probability of default of a country's banking system, calculated as a weighted average of the z-scores of a country's individual banks (the weights are based on the individual banks' total assets). the z-score compares a bank's buffers (capitalization and returns) with the volatility of those returns. 4 The Cronbach Coefficient Alpha assesses how a set of indicators measures a uni-dimensional concept (OECD, 2008 ) . This technique is useful for clustering similar variables. It therefore seems particularly appropriate for the chosen Kaufmann indicators, which are highly correlated. 5 We also carried out the same exercise with a different threshold: that is, we used the mean of the institutional indicators to create the two sub-samples of interest. These results are not reported here but are available upon request.
6
It is worth mentioning that, in order to verify whether the differences observed in the two groups were statistically significant, we carried out a further check. That is, we ran a regression between the variable of interest (i.e. any of the explanatory variables of Equation 1) and the dummy classifying the two groups of countries. If both the variable of interest and the interaction term were statistically significant, it could be concluded that the effect of the selected explanatory variable was different across the two groups (i.e. very low vs. good quality institutions); and hence that internal institutions played a major role in determining the severity of the crisis in terms of output loss 7
To be noted is that, following the suggestion of an anonymous referee, we have replicated our exercise in three distinct cross-sections, one for each of the years considered (i.e. 2008-2010) . The results of our main exercise are qualitatively unaltered. To save space, we do not report them here, but they are available upon request. We thank a referee for suggesting this important robustness check. 8 To be noted is that, in order to assess the relative importance of financial institutions and financial markets, we have split our sample into bank-based and market-based economies. This has been done following the recent work of Gambacorta et al.(2014) . In line with Levine (2002) , Beck and Levine (2002) and Chakraborty and Rayb (2006) we do not find evidence that one system
